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ABSTRACT
In this study, I examine the extent to which auditor attributes affect the auditor’s decision
to communicate a Critical Audit Matter (CAM) in the expanded auditor’s report. I expect the
CAM communication decision to be adversely affected by threats to independence and by
auditor overconfidence. I focus on a sample of companies that completed material mergers and
acquisitions because these are likely to be considered as potential CAMs by meeting the minimal
requirements of a CAM (i.e., material accounts or disclosures that involve especially
challenging, subjective, or complex auditor judgment). Contrary to expectations, I find that the
auditor’s CAM communication decision is influenced by the complexity of the M&A transaction
and operations – a rather objective reason for communicating a CAM. While I find variation in
CAM communication frequencies by the audit firm, I find little evidence suggesting that auditor
attributes at the office- and firm-level affect the auditor’s CAM communication decision.
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SECTION I. INTRODUCTION
Auditors must exercise judgment in nearly every aspect of the audits they perform, from
risk assessment through audit documentation.1 In 2017, the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB) released a new auditing standard to expand the auditor’s report,
Auditing Standard (AS) 3101 The Auditor’s Report on an Audit of Financial Statements When
the Auditor Expresses an Unqualified Opinion. This new standard requires auditors to identify
and communicate Critical Audit Matter (CAM) that relates to material accounts or disclosures
and that involves “especially challenging, subjective, or complex auditor judgment” (PCAOB
2017). As the PCAOB states in its 2019 Staff Guidance, the Board expects that auditor judgment
will influence the determination and communication of CAMs (PCAOB 2019). In this study, I
use the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) setting to examine the determinants of an auditor’s
CAM communication decision. Specifically, I use a sample of companies that completed
material acquisitions in the initial year that is subject to AS 3101 and examine whether
engagement-specific auditor attributes influence the auditor’s decision to communicate M&Arelated CAMs while controlling for the complexity of the audit matter and the complexity of the
company’s operations and accounting systems.
Although CAMs span a variety of topics, I focus on the M&A setting for several reasons.
First, it is reasonable to assume that auditors will consider accounts or disclosures related to
material M&As as potential CAMs and must exercise professional judgment in their CAM
communication decision. The communication of a CAM is the joint product of the underlying
audit matter meeting the PCAOB’s definition of a CAM and the auditor exercising professional

1

The use of professional judgment is discussed in the auditing standards published by the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). See AS 1001 Responsibilities and Functions of the Independent Auditor, AS
1015 Due Professional Care in the Performance of Work, and AS 1215 Audit Documentation.
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judgment to communicate the identified CAM in the expanded auditor’s report. Because M&As
are inherently risky and complex transactions, auditors need to apply substantial professional
judgment when auditing the combined entity, especially in the audits of material accounts or
disclosures arising from the M&A. As auditors develop a list of potential CAMs,2 accounts or
disclosures related to material M&A transactions are very likely to be considered as potential
CAMs. Therefore, by focusing on audit matters that are highly likely to meet the definition of a
CAM and by controlling for the complexity of the audit and operations, my setting allows me to
more cleanly explore the factors associated with the professional judgment that auditors apply in
their decision to communicate a CAM.
Moreover, restricting the focus to M&A-related audit matters ensures that the type of
auditor judgment involved in auditing the underlying audit matter is consistent across audit
engagements. All acquiring companies, regardless of the industry they are in, are required to
record all acquired assets and liabilities at fair values on the acquisition date in accordance with
Accounting Standards Code (ASC) 805 Business Combinations. Therefore, the auditor judgment
involved in auditing companies that recently completed material acquisitions relates primarily to
assessing the fair values of the accounts and disclosures that arise from the transaction. Because
auditing different accounts and disclosures will require different types of auditor judgment and
the type of auditor judgment required in auditing M&A-related accounts and disclosures are
consistent across audit engagements, limiting the scope to M&A-related CAMs allows me to
focus on the factors that influence auditor judgment involved in communicating CAMs.
Additionally, M&A-related CAMs are regularly referred to in professional publications when

2

See the comment letter submitted by Grant Thornton, available at
https://pcaobus.org/EconomicAndRiskAnalysis/pir/PostImplementationReviewAS3101UnqualifiedOpinion/8_GT.p
df.
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providing implementation guidance on the expanded auditor’s report.3 It is not surprising, then,
that M&A is one of the topics with the highest number of CAMs among the initial adopters of AS
3101.
Auditors create communicative value to financial statement users by disclosing
information about the audit engagement in the auditor’s report (Coram et al. 2011). To improve
the relevance and informativeness of the auditor’s report, AS 3101 requires auditors to not only
identify CAM(s) but also explain why auditors determined that an audit matter qualified as a
CAM. The standard also requires auditors to provide additional discussions around how they
addressed the CAM in the audit, including a brief overview of the procedures performed and an
indication of the outcomes of the audit procedures. On the one hand, auditors have incentives to
communicate CAMs when they believe the communicated CAM improves the usefulness of the
auditor’s report, which can demonstrate the quality of their service especially in complex
situations such as M&As. Post-implementation comments from investors confirm that CAM
communications benefit them with more constructive conversations with management because
they are able to better understand the auditor’s work.4 On the other hand, auditors may feel
pressured to minimize the number of CAMs reported. Some companies argue that the
communication of CAMs will allow auditors to provide information that has not been made
publicly available or may contradict the information already provided by management, adding

Examples include the PCAOB’s response to public comments on the proposed auditor reporting standard in May
2016, a discussion by the Center for Audit Quality in December 2018, and the PCAOB’s implementation guidance
in May 2019, available at https://pcaobus.org/Rulemaking/Docket034/Release-2016-003-ARM.pdf,
https://www.thecaq.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/caq_critical_audit_matters_lessons_questions_example_201812.pdf, and https://pcaobus.org/Standards/Documents/Implementation-Critical-Audit-Matters-Deeper-DiveCommunication-of-CAMs.pdf.
4
See the comment letter submitted by the Council of Institutional Investors, available at
https://pcaobus.org/EconomicAndRiskAnalysis/pir/PostImplementationReviewAS3101UnqualifiedOpinion/5_CII.p
df.
3
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unnecessary tension to the auditor-client relationship.5 Some auditors reveal that they are hesitant
to communicate a CAM because they incur additional costs in drafting, reviewing, and
communicating each CAM and they do not believe that the expanded auditor’s report benefits
financial statement users.6
I expect two key attributes of the auditor to affect the auditor’s CAM communication
decision – threats to independence and overconfidence. Threats to independence, proxied for by
client importance and by the ratio of total fees generated from non-audit services, arise from
economic incentives for the auditor to maintain its relationship with the client, thus making
auditors more likely to report in alignment with their clients’ preference. Overconfidence,
proxied for by the auditor's tenure and by the auditor’s prior experience with M&As, could allow
the auditor to underweight the complexity of the audit matter and thus be less likely to
communicate a CAM. Because the PCAOB notes in its final rule that the determination and
communication of CAMs depend on the nature and complexity of the audit, which in turn
depends on the complexity of the operations and accounting systems of the company, I also
include factors related to M&A deal characteristics and company characteristics to isolate the
influence of auditor characteristics on the auditor’s CAM communication decision.
I manually collect a sample of initial adopters of AS 3101 (i.e., large accelerated filers
with fiscal year-ends on or after June 30, 2019) that have completed at least one material M&A
in the fiscal year subject to the new auditor reporting standard. For the 621 initial adopters that

5

See the comment letters submitted by ConocoPhillips Company, Pfizer Inc., and CA Technologies, Inc., available
at https://pcaobus.org/Rulemaking/Docket034/05c_ConocoPhillips-Audit-Committee.pdf,
https://pcaobus.org/Rulemaking/Pages/Docket034Comments.aspx, and
https://pcaobus.org/Rulemaking/Docket034/052c_CA-Technologies.pdf.
6
See the comment letters submitted by Mazars USA and Grant Thornton, available at
https://pcaobus.org/EconomicAndRiskAnalysis/pir/PostImplementationReviewAS3101UnqualifiedOpinion/19_MA
ZARS_USA_LLP.pdf and
https://pcaobus.org/EconomicAndRiskAnalysis/pir/PostImplementationReviewAS3101UnqualifiedOpinion/8_GT.p
df.

4

completed material M&As, 292 auditors communicate M&A-related CAMs in auditors’ reports
(47 percent). I find that the total number of CAMs in the auditor’s report and the frequency of
M&A-related CAMs vary by the audit firm, suggesting that firm-specific policies and training
affect auditors’ judgment in the CAM communication decision. However, after controlling for
deal and company characteristics that capture the complexity of the audit matter and the
complexity of the company’s operations and accounting systems, I fail to find a significant
association between auditor characteristics and M&A-related CAMs communicated in the
expanded auditor’s report. It suggests that neither threats to independence, nor overconfidence,
significantly affect the auditor's professional judgment involved in the decision to communicate
a CAM. Consistent with the PCAOB’s statement, I find that the decision is driven by M&A deal
characteristics (deal size, whether the company completed multiple acquisitions in the fiscal
year, and whether the company is a serial acquirer) and company characteristics (e.g., the
number of business and geographic segments, international operations). Taken together, these
results suggest that the auditor’s CAM communication decision is not random and that it is
driven by the complexity of the audit matter and operations, rather than the engagement-specific
auditor attributes.
My study contributes to the literature on auditor judgment. Experimental studies directly
observe the factors that affect auditor judgment and document the consequences of inappropriate
judgment (Leung and Trotman 2005, Bratten et al. 2013, Griffith et al. 2015). My study adds to
the line of prior empirical studies that draw indirect inferences about auditor judgment based on
publicly observable auditor characteristics. Several studies find evidence of auditor
characteristics affecting auditor judgment observed indirectly through goodwill impairment
(Carcello et al. 2020), asset impairment (Stein 2019), and going concern opinions (Blay and
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Geiger 2013). I observe auditor judgment through CAMs communicated in the auditor’s report
and find that auditor characteristics do not significantly influence the professional judgment
auditors apply when making reporting decisions.
I also contribute to the growing literature on the expanded auditor’s report, including
CAMs in the United States (U.S.) and Key Audit Matters (KAMs) internationally. Experimental
studies show that CAMs/KAMs influence how financial statement users view the information
provided in the auditor’s report (Christensen et al. 2014, Boolaky and Quick 2016, Sirois et al.
2018, Kachelmeier et al. 2019). Empirical studies generally explore the overall impact of the
expanded auditor’s report and find mixed evidence (Gutierrez et al. 2018, Goh et al. 2019, Reid
et al. 2019, Lennox et al. 2019, Liao et al. 2019, Burke et al. 2020, Drake et al. 2020). My study
is among the first to examine CAMs in a specific category, which allows me to focus on audit
matters meeting the minimal requirement of a CAM and draw inferences on the factors that
influence auditor judgment. My findings indicate that the auditor’s decision to communicate a
CAM is driven by the complexity of the underlying audit matter rather than auditor
characteristics expected to proxy for potential biases or judgment tendencies.
My study responds to the PCAOB’s call for more information to fully understand the
auditor’s communication of CAMs following the implementation of AS 3101.7 Specifically, my
study concludes that the auditor’s decision to communicate a CAM is driven by the complexity
of the underlying audit matter and the company’s operations, rather than engagement-specific
auditor attributes or firm-level policies and training. These findings should also be of interest to

See “Post-Implementation Review of AS 3101, The Auditor’s Report on an Audit of Financial Statements When
the Auditor Expresses an Unqualified Opinion,” available at
https://pcaobus.org/EconomicAndRiskAnalysis/pir/Pages/Post-Implementation-Review-AS-3101-Auditors-ReportAudit-Financial-Statements-When-Auditor-Expresses-Unqualified-Opinion.aspx.
7

6

audit committees responsible for overseeing the audit engagement and to investors relying on the
auditor’s report.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses my expectations
and presents my research design. Section III describes my sample. Section IV provides empirical
results, and Section V concludes.
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SECTION II. EXPECTATIONS DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH DESIGN
Critical Audit Matters
Although companies’ operations have become more complex and auditors have been
required to perform procedures involving more challenging judgment, the format of the auditor’s
report has changed little since the 1940s (PCAOB 2017). In the auditor’s report, the auditor
expresses his or her opinions on the financial statements. Unqualified opinions provide
reasonable assurance that the financial statements are free from material misstatements in
accordance with the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), whereas qualified and
adverse opinions suggest at least one material departure from GAAP.8 Because a vast majority of
public companies receive unqualified opinions (Lennox 2005, Gray et al. 2011) and because
auditors use standardized language in the auditor’s report, investors argue that the auditor’s
report provides little information when opinions are unqualified and meaningful information
only in extreme circumstances.9 To increase the informativeness and relevance of the auditor’s
report, the PCAOB proposed significant changes to the auditor reporting model in May 2016 and
adopted the final standard, AS 3101, in June 2017 (PCAOB 2017). The newly adopted standard
retains the traditional types of audit opinions while requiring auditors to provide new information
about the audit by communicating CAMs in the auditor’s report.
In its final rule, the PCAOB defines CAMs as “matters communicated or required to be
communicated to the audit committee and that (1) relate to accounts or disclosures that are
material to the financial statements, and (2) involve especially challenging, subjective, or
complex auditor judgment (PCAOB 2017).” CAMs cover a wide range of topics – revenue,

8

Another type of audit opinions is disclaimers, indicating that the auditor is unable to form opinions due to
insufficient audit evidence.
9
See “Improving the Auditor’s Report,” available at
https://pcaobus.org/News/Events/Documents/03162011_IAGMeeting/Role_Of_The_Auditor.pdf.
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intangible assets, contingent liabilities, income taxes, and many others. In my study, I focus
specifically on M&A-related CAMs because accounts or disclosures related to material M&As
are most likely to qualify as CAMs. Prior to the adoption of AS 3101, auditors were not able to
provide information about the M&A transaction in the traditional binary “pass/fail” auditor
reporting model. In the expanded auditor’s report, auditors have the opportunity to provide
information about their audit of a newly combined entity, especially about the accounts or
disclosures related to M&As, if the audit matter meets the definition of a CAM, regardless of the
type of opinion they issue. For example, WestRock Company, a large accelerated filer based in
Atlanta, Georgia, completed its acquisition of KapStone Paper and Packaging Corporation in the
company’s first fiscal quarter. EY issued an unqualified opinion with three CAMs (“Accounting
for the Acquisition of KapStone Paper and Packaging Corporation,” “Test of Goodwill for
Impairment,” and “Uncertain Tax Positions”), one of which is an M&A-related CAM.
Specifically, in the auditor’s report, EY states that its audit of the purchase price allocation
involved “especially subjective and complex judgments” and provides a discussion about how
the auditor addressed this CAM in its audit, which includes testing the controls related to the
accounting for the acquisition, engaging valuation specialists to assist with its evaluation of
management assumptions, and performing sensitivity analyses of several accounts involved in
the transaction. Appendix A provides EY’s audit report for WestRock Company issued on
November 15, 2019.
Literature Review on CAMs
To improve the informativeness and relevance of the auditor’s report, regulators and
standard setters worldwide adopted an expanded auditor reporting model requiring auditors to
report CAMs/KAMs (Financial Reporting Council 2013, IAASB 2015, PCAOB 2017).

9

Experimental studies find that the information communicated in CAMs/KAMs alters the
behavior of management (Bentley et al. 2020) and audit committees (Kang 2019), the decisions
of financial statement users (Christensen et al. 2014, Boolaky and Quick 2016, Ozlanski 2019,
Rapley et al. 2018), and the perceived liability of auditors (Brasel et al. 2016, Gimbar et al. 2016,
Kachelmeier et al. 2019). Several empirical studies use the U.K. setting to assess the information
content of the new auditor’s report and its impact on the stock and debt markets. Gutierrez et al.
(2018) conclude that investors do not find the expanded auditor’s report incrementally
informative and Lennox et al. (2019) document that the lack of incremental information is due to
companies disclosing information in other channels before the release of the auditor’s report.
Porumb et al. (2019) show that the expanded auditor’s report improves lending terms by
reducing information asymmetry. Reid et al. (2019) and Smith (2019) examine the overall
impact of adopting the new auditor’s reporting model and find that both the readability of the
auditor’s report (Smith 2019) and the client’s financial reporting quality (Reid et al. 2019)
improves. Empirical studies outside of the U.K. find that the expanded auditor’s report provides
incremental information to investors in China (Goh et al. 2019), although investors in France
(Bedard et al. 2019) and Hong Kong (Liao et al. 2019) do not find the expanded auditor’s report
incrementally informative.
After CAM reporting became effective for large accelerated filers in the U.S. on June 30,
2019, several studies have explored the impact of the expanded auditor reporting model.
Although the PCAOB intended to improve the relevance and informativeness of the auditor’s
report, Files and Gencer (2020) and Luo (2021) document that investors in the U.S. do not find
CAMs informative. Klevak et al. (2020) find that greater amounts of CAM disclosures indicate
greater uncertainty. Burke et al. (2020) document that management improves its disclosures as

10

an indirect benefit of the new auditor reporting standard. Drake et al. (2020) document that taxrelated CAMs indirectly benefit investors by constraining tax-related earnings management. My
study is among the first to focus on CAMs in a specific category. By examining audit matters
that are highly likely to meet the definition of a CAM, I study the factors that determine the
auditor’s decision to communicate a CAM in the auditor’s report.
Expectations Development
A long line of experimental research shows that auditor-specific attributes are associated
with auditor judgment. Several studies investigate auditor judgment in the engagement planning
stage and find that auditor judgment of fraud risk is influenced by the auditor’s fraud knowledge
(Hammersley 2011), internal controls knowledge (Hammersley et al. 2011), planning stage effort
(Hammersley et al. 2010), and brainstorming sessions (Carpenter 2007, Hoffman and Zimbelman
2009). Other studies examine auditor judgment in the audits of complex estimates and find that
auditor judgment is influenced by the auditor’s mindset (Griffith et al. 2015), attitude (Nolder
and Kadous 2018), and use of specialists (Griffith 2018). Bratten et al. (2013) document that
environmental factors and task factors also influence auditor judgment in the audits of complex
estimates.
Although prior experimental studies examine various aspects of auditor judgment, it is
nonetheless difficult to observe and measure empirically. Following prior literature and the
CAQ’s Professional Judgment Resources,10 I develop a set of auditor characteristics that I expect
to affect the auditor’s decision to communicate a CAM.

See “Professional Judgment Resources”, available at https://www.thecaq.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/03/professional-judgment-resource.pdf.
10
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Threats to Independence
As stated by the PCAOB in AS 1005 Independence, it is critically important for auditors
to be independent because public confidence in the profession will be impaired if independence
is lacking.11 Auditors have economic incentives to grow their business through retaining existing
clients and gaining new clients. These economic incentives could pose threats to auditor
independence when auditors try to please their clients, which further hinders auditors from
appropriately applying professional judgment. Many companies opposed the CAM reporting
requirements arguing that the communication of CAMs in the auditors’ report would blur the
responsibilities of management and auditors (PCAOB 2017). In addition, some auditors
expressed concerns that CAMs would increase the perceived liability of auditors and that they
would incur additional costs while experiencing little improvement in the usefulness of the
auditor’s report (PCAOB 2017). Therefore, given that companies pushed back on CAM
reporting requirements and that auditors had their own hesitations, auditors have incentives to
avoid communicating CAMs, particularly in situations where they face pressure from their
clients and their independence is threatened. I posit that threats to independence will make the
auditor less likely to communicate CAMs, ceteris paribus.
In my setting, I use two separate proxies for threats to independence. The first one is
client importance. DeAngelo (1981) suggests that audit fees create an economic bond between
auditor and client. Consistent with this notion, prior studies show that the importance of a
particular client relative to an auditor’s client portfolio in an office influences the incentive
alignment between auditor and client (Craswell et al. 2002, Reynold and Francis 2000, Francis
and Yu 2009). When auditors have incentives to bond with economically important clients, they

11

See “AS 1005: Independence,” available at https://pcaobus.org/Standards/Auditing/Pages/AS1005.aspx.
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face challenges in maintaining an independent mindset needed to exercise due professional care.
Therefore, I posit that a client’s importance at the office level poses threats to independence,
which can adversely affect the auditor’s CAM communication decision.
The second one is the ratio of total fees generated from non-audit services. Regulators
generally view the auditor’s provision of non-audit services as a threat to auditor independence,
arguing that it enlarges the economic bonding between the two parties (SEC 2002, PCAOB
2011). Prior studies find that the provision of non-audit services hinders auditors from
appropriately applying professional judgment in audit engagements, observed through a lower
likelihood of the clients recording goodwill impairment (Carcello et al. 2000), the auditor’s
failure to issue going-concern opinions to financially distressed clients (Blay and Geiger 2013),
and the auditor’ failure to detect material weaknesses in the clients’ internal controls (Rice and
Weber 2012). Because CAM reporting decision is in the list of auditor reporting decisions that
auditors are required to make, I posit that the provision of non-audit services poses a threat to
independence, which can adversely affect the auditor’s decision to communicate a CAM.
Overconfidence
In the audit context, overconfidence is the tendency that an auditor overestimates his or
her ability to perform tasks or make decisions (CAQ 2019). Prior experimental studies document
that overconfidence exists in the auditing profession (Owhoso and Weickgenannt 2009) and
varies with task difficulty (Han et al. 2011). By definition, CAMs are audit matters that require
auditors to exercise especially complex and challenging judgment when auditing the related
accounts and disclosures. Because overconfident auditors can overestimate their abilities, they
will be less likely to determine that the level of judgment involved is especially challenging or
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complex, thus reducing the likelihood of them identifying an audit matter as a CAM. Therefore, I
posit that overconfidence will make auditors less likely to communicate CAMs, ceteris paribus.
In my setting, I use two separate proxies for overconfidence. The first one is auditor
M&A expertise. A long line of studies explores the relation between various types of auditor
expertise and find that expert auditors provide high-quality audits (Dunn and Mayhew 2004,
Knechel et al. 2007, Reichelt and Wang 2010, McGuire et al. 2012, Christensen et al. 2016,
Haislip et al. 2016, Ahn et al. 2020). In the context of M&As, Gal-Or et al. (2019) find that
companies audited by M&A expert auditors exhibit higher financial reporting quality in the postacquisition period. Auditors with M&A expertise are familiar with the accounting standards
around business combinations and have experience evaluating the management assumptions and
estimates in M&As. Therefore, I posit that auditor M&A expertise creates a potential judgment
tendency of overconfidence that can affect the auditor's judgment in the decision to communicate
an M&A-related CAM. Specifically, if auditors with M&A expertise already exhibit higher audit
quality over the accounts and disclosures related to M&As, they may be less likely to determine
that the judgment or difficulties involved arise to a “critical” audit matter.
The second one is the auditor’s client-specific knowledge, which the auditor accumulates
from serving as the client’s auditor over a period of time. The PCAOB perceives long auditorclient tenure as a threat to audit quality, arguing that long tenure breeds familiarity (PCAOB
2011, 2017). However, most empirical studies find that client-specific knowledge from long
auditor tenure helps auditors constrain management’s discretion in financial reporting because
client-specific knowledge leads to more effective engagement planning and execution (Geiger
and Raghunandan 2002, Johnson et al. 2002, Myers et al. 2003). I posit that client-specific
knowledge from long auditor tenure creates a potential judgment tendency of overconfidence
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that can negatively affect the auditor's judgment in the auditor’s decision to communicate an
M&A-related CAM. Specifically, if auditors accumulate a substantial understanding of the
client’s risk, operations, and accounting systems from serving as the client’s auditor, they may be
less likely to determine that the judgment involved arise to a “critical” audit matter.
Research Design
To examine the factors that influence the auditor’s decision to communicate an M&Arelated CAM, I estimate the following logistic model:
CAMit = α1 IMPORTANCE it + α2NAS it + α3 ACQ_EXPERTit + α4 TENUREit + α5 DEAL_SIZEit +
α6 MULTIPLE_ACQit + α7 GOODWILLit + α8 SERIALit + α9 INTAN_GROWit +
α10 RESTATEit + α11 ARCit + α12 SIZEit + α13 LEVit + α14 MTBit + α15 LOSSit +
α16 FOREIGNit + α17 SEGit + α18 INTANit-1 + α19 TOTAL_CAMit +
Auditor Fixed Effects + Industry Fixed Effects + εit
(1)
where i and t represent the audited company and fiscal year, respectively.
CAM is an indicator variable equal to one if the auditor communicates a CAM related to
M&As in the expanded auditor’s report, and zero otherwise. The Audit Analytics CAMs dataset
provides the topics of CAMs and I use CAMs categorized under the topic of “business
combinations” to construct this variable.12
My first set of determinants relates to the factors associated with auditor characteristics. I
use two auditor characteristics to proxy for threats to independence – client importance and the
proportion of fees from non-audit services. Following Francis and Yu (2009), I define client
importance (IMPORTANCE) as the ratio of the client’s total fees to the sum of fees for all clients
in the audit office. Following Carcello et al. (2020), I use the ratio of non-audit service fees to
total fees (NAS) to measure auditor independence.13 I use two auditor characteristics to proxy for

Prior to the availability of this dataset, I hand collected 132 M&A-related CAMs and find that Audit Analytics’
classification of “business combinations” CAMs agrees with my hand collected data in all cases.
13
Inferences remain unchanged when I use the natural log of NAS fees instead of the ratio of NAS fees.
12
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overconfidence – auditor M&A expertise and tenure. Following Gal-Or et al. (2019), I define
auditor M&A expertise (ACQ_EXPERT) as an indicator variable set equal to one if at least 30
percent of all clients at an audit office completed an acquisition in the current or prior two fiscal
years, and zero otherwise.14 I use auditor tenure (TENURE) to measure the auditor’s clientspecific knowledge and define it as the natural log of the auditor’s tenure measured in years.15
In its final rule, the PCAOB states that the determination of CAM will depend on the
nature and complexity of the audit, which in turn depends on the complexity of the company’s
operations and accounting systems (PCAOB 2017). Therefore, I posit that, in addition to the
auditor characteristics, the complexity of the M&A transaction, operations, and accounting
systems will also influence the auditor’s decision to communicate an M&A-related CAM.
My second set of determinants relates to M&A deal characteristics that proxy for the
complexity of the audit matter. CAMs are audit matters related to accounts or disclosures that are
material to financial statements and my discussions with audit partners confirm that deal size is
the first factor they consider when determining whether to communicate an M&A-related
CAM.16 Because deal size is the most important factor in determining an M&A-related CAM, I
find that the strongest relation between the set of determinants and the likelihood of the auditor
communicating an M&A-related CAM exists when I measure deal size using quintile ranks.
Specifically, I first compute the materiality of the deal (DEAL_MATERIALITY), defined as the
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Inferences remain unchanged when I follow Gal-Or et al. (2019) and define auditor M&A expertise as an
indicator variable set equal to one if the auditor audit 30 clients that completed M&As in the current and previous
two years, and zero otherwise.
15
One auditor characteristic commonly used in prior audit studies is auditor office size (e.g., Choi et al. 2010).
Consistent with Francis and Yu (2009), I find that client importance is highly correlated with office size. Because
including both variables raises the concern of multicollinearity, I only include client importance in my model. I find,
untabulated, that my inferences remain unchanged when I include office size as an additional auditor characteristic
in the model.
16
I thank one anonymous Big4 audit partner and one anonymous non-Big4 audit partner for discussions about
CAMs.
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transaction value of the M&A deal scaled by total assets at the beginning of the fiscal period.17 I
then construct deal size (DEAL_SIZE) based on the quintile of DEAL_MATERIALITY.
DEAL_SIZE takes the value of 1 through 5, with 5 indicating the largest deals (i.e., deals in the
top quintile based on DEAL_MATERIALITY). Moreover, companies can engage in multiple
acquisitions in a fiscal year. Integrating business operations and accounting systems multiple
times in one fiscal year could prove difficult for the combined entity, which can also create
challenges for the auditor. Therefore, I include whether the company completed multiple
acquisitions in a fiscal year (MULTIPLE_ACQ) as a deal characteristic. In addition, one key
component in acquisition accounting is goodwill. Li et al. (2011) suggest that goodwill is
attributable to overpayment for the target and that investors perceive goodwill impairments
negatively because they indicate declines in future profitability. I include the percentage of the
purchase price allocated to goodwill (GOODWILL) as a deal characteristic. Furthermore,
companies differ in M&A strategies: some complete frequent M&As as a primary way to expand
their operations, whereas others engage in M&As only when they find a suitable target. The
management of serial acquirers is more experienced at developing estimates and fair values for
the targets, possibly by engaging valuation experts that they are familiar with. Therefore, I
include serial acquirer (SERIAL) as a deal characteristic. Additionally, ASC 805 Business
Combinations requires the acquirer to record the net identifiable assets of the target at the fair
values on the acquisition date. Unlike tangible assets, intangible assets (e.g., customer
relationships, trademarks) do not have readily available fair market values. Management must
estimate the fair values of these intangible assets and auditors must assess the management’s
estimates in the audits of the combined entity. Because auditing intangible assets involve

17

When the company completed multiple acquisitions in the fiscal period, I use the sum of the transaction value
from all M&A deals to compute DEAL_MATERIALITY.
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substantial auditor judgment, I include growth in intangible assets (excluding goodwill) as a deal
characteristic (INTAN_GROW).
My last set of determinants relates to company characteristics that proxy for the
complexity of operations and accounting systems. Because companies that announce
restatements of their financial statements are scrutinized by investors and analysts (Palmrose et
al. 2004), I include a restatement announcement indicator (RESTATE). Because CAMs depend
on the complexity of the accounting system of the company (PCAOB 2017), I control for the
accounting reporting complexity (ARC) following Hoitash and Hoitash (2018). Because the
determination and communication of CAMs also depend on the complexity of the operations of
the company, I control for the size (SIZE, FOREIGN, SEG), financial condition (LEV, LOSS),
and growth (MTB) of the company. In addition, I control for the ratio of intangible assets to total
assets at the beginning of the period (INTAN) and the total number of CAMs communicated by
the auditor (TOTAL_CAM).
I define industries based on the division classification provided by the North America
Industry Classification System (NAICS) Association. Due to the small number of non-Big4
auditors in my sample, I combine all non-Big4 auditors into one auditor category when
constructing auditor fixed effects, and each of the Big4 auditors is in its own auditor category.
All variables are measured as defined in Appendix B.
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SECTION III. DATA AND SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
Sample
To examine my research question, I restrict the sample to the initial adopters of PCAOB
AS 3101 (i.e., large accelerated filers with fiscal year-ends on or after June 30, 2019, and on or
before June 30, 2020). I then manually search the annual financial statements of these companies
to determine whether they have completed at least one material acquisition in the fiscal year
subject to the CAM reporting requirements. I identify M&As by searching their 10-K filings for
“acquisition(s)”, “merger(s)”, and “business combination(s)”. Because CAMs relate to accounts
or disclosures that are material to the financial statements, I remove M&A deals that these
companies identified as “immaterial” in the 10-Ks.18 For this sample of companies completing at
least one material acquisition, I use the Audit Analytics CAMs dataset to identify whether the
auditor communicates a CAM related to M&As in the auditor’s report. I define M&A-related
CAMs as CAMs categorized under the topic of “business combinations”. I eliminate
observations where I could not identify auditor, deal, or company characteristics. I first run
equation (1) using a Linear Probability Model to identify influential observations. Following
Leone et al. (2019), I remove 47 influential observations identified using influence diagnostics
(Cook’s Distance). My final sample consists of 621 large accelerated filers that are initial
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A commonly used database for M&A deals is the SDC Mergers and Acquisitions database. Because it does not
differentiate between material and immaterial acquisitions and because immaterial acquisitions do not meet the
definition of a CAM, I manually search the 10-Ks to identify material acquisitions instead of using the SDC Mergers
and Acquisitions database. For example, Walmart Inc. completed the acquisition of Flipkart, a foreign eCommerce
business, in the second quarter of fiscal 2020 for cash consideration of $16 billion and identified the Flipkart
acquisition as immaterial in the 10-K
(https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/104169/000010416920000011/wmtform10-kx1312020.htm). I exclude
this deal from my sample because the company identified it as an immaterial acquisition in the 10-K.
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adopters of AS 3101 and that completed material M&As in the initial year subject to PCAOB AS
3101. I report my sample construction procedures in Table 1 Panel A.
Table 1 Panel B reports the sample distribution by industry following the industry
division classification by the NAICS Association. Auditors, on average, report 1.8 CAMs,
consistent with the early evidence in Hollie (2019). The industry with the largest number of
completed material acquisitions is the manufacturing industry. Significant variation across
industries exists in the likelihood of the auditor communicating an M&A-related CAM in the
auditor’s report.
Table 1 Panel C reports the sample distribution by auditor. EY has the largest presence in
my sample with the highest number of clients that completed material acquisitions, the highest
number of CAMs per client, and the frequency of M&A-related CAMs.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 Panel A reports descriptive statistics of my initial sample. Table 2 Panel B
reports descriptive statistics of my final sample after removing influential observations. The
variable exhibiting the largest difference between Panel A and Panel B is DEAL_MATERIALITY.
The mean (standard deviation) decreases from 0.1 to 0.096 (from 0.182 to 0.148).
As reported in Table 2 Panel B, fees from a specific client are 12.4 percent of total fees
from all clients in an engagement office and 15.4 percent of total fees are from non-audit
services on average. Consistent with Gal-Or et al. (2019), 4 percent of auditors are M&A
experts. Auditors have a mean tenure of 15 years. Regarding M&A deal characteristics, the
M&A deal value is 14.8 percent of the acquirer’s total assets at the beginning of the year and 34
percent of companies completed more than one acquisition in the initial year subject to PCAOB
AS 3101. Companies allocate 46.1 percent of the total purchase price to goodwill on average and
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23.5 percent of sample companies completed at least one acquisition in each of the current and
previous two fiscal years. The acquiring companies grow the intangibles assets 1 percent after
acquisition completion on average.
Table 2 Panel C reports the tests of difference in means between companies with and
without an M&A-related CAM. In univariate tests, I do not find significant differences in the
auditor characteristics. Regarding M&A deal characteristics, companies with M&A-related
CAMs engage in larger deals. Regarding company characteristics, companies with M&A-related
CAMs are smaller in size, more likely to have a loss, have a lower market-to-book ratio, are less
likely to have foreign operations, report a smaller number of business and geographic segments,
and report a higher proportion of intangible assets. For companies with M&A-related CAMs,
auditors communicate significantly more CAMs in the auditor’s report.
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SECTION IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Determinants of M&A-related CAMs
Table 3 reports the relation between auditor and deal characteristics and the
communication of M&A-related CAMs. I examine whether auditor characteristics determine the
auditor’s decision to communicate an M&A-related CAM excluding and including audit firm
indicators in Columns (1) and (2) respectively. In Column (1), I fail to find that auditor
characteristics are significantly associated with the likelihood of the auditor communicating an
M&A-related CAM at conventional levels. These results suggest that threats to independence
and overconfidence at the office level do not significantly influence the auditor’s CAM
communication decision. In Column (2), I fail to find that auditor characteristics at both office
and firm levels are significantly associated with the auditor’s CAM communication decision at
conventional levels, except for one audit firm. Although audit firms have firm-specific policies
and implemented firm-wide training to comply with the CAM reporting requirements,19 my
results suggest that firm-specific characteristics do not significantly influence the auditor’s CAM
communication decision. The area under the ROC curve is 0.534 and 0.596 respectively in
Columns (1) and (2). I examine whether M&A deal characteristics determine the auditor’s
decision to communicate an M&A-related CAM in Column (3). I find that deal size and whether
the company completed multiple acquisitions in the initial year subject to AS 3101 are
significantly associated with the likelihood of the auditor communicating an M&A-related CAM
(p-value < 0.01). The area under the ROC curve is 0.899. In Column (4), I include auditor

19

See the comment letters submitted by Deloitte and EY, available at
https://pcaobus.org/EconomicAndRiskAnalysis/pir/PostImplementationReviewAS3101UnqualifiedOpinion/6_Deloi
tte-Touche-LLP.pdf and
https://pcaobus.org/EconomicAndRiskAnalysis/pir/PostImplementationReviewAS3101UnqualifiedOpinion/20_EY.
pdf.
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characteristics, audit firm indicators, and M&A deal characteristics. I consistently find that M&A
deal characteristics are significantly associated with the auditor’s decision to communicate an
M&A-related CAM and fail to find that auditor characteristics are significantly associated with
the auditor’s CAM communication decision, except for one audit firm. The area under the ROC
curve is 0.908. Overall, these results suggest that the auditor’s decision to communicate an
M&A-related CAM is not random and that it is driven by the complexity of the underlying audit
matter rather than engagement-specific auditor attributes.
Table 4 reports the relation between the auditor, deal, and company characteristics and
the communication of M&A-related CAMs without fixed effects in Column (1), with audit firm
fixed effects in Column (2), and with audit firm fixed effects and industry fixed effects in
Column (3). I consistently fail to find that auditor characteristics are significantly associated with
the auditor’s decision to communicate an M&A-related CAM at conventional levels. Regarding
M&A deal characteristics, I consistently find that deal size and whether the company completed
multiple acquisitions in the fiscal year are significantly associated with the auditor’s decision to
communicate an M&A-related CAM (p-value < 0.01, p-value < 0.05 respectively). I find some
evidence that whether the company is a serial acquirer significantly influences the auditor’s
CAM communication decision. Regarding company characteristics, I consistently find that
restatement announcement, size, and the number of segments are negatively associated with the
likelihood of the auditor communicating an M&A-related CAM (p-value < 0.1, p-value < 0.05,
and p-value < 0.05, respectively). I find some evidence that leverage and whether the company
has foreign operations significantly influence the auditor’s CAM communication decision. The
area under the ROC curve is above 0.96 in all three columns. Taken together, these results
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suggest that the auditor’s decision to communicate an M&A-related CAM is driven by M&A
deal characteristics and company characteristics.
In Table 5, I use stepwise logit regression to investigate the optimal combination of
factors that influence the auditor’s decision to communicate an M&A-related CAM. By
systematically eliminating variables that are the least helpful in explaining the outcome, stepwise
logit regression is particularly helpful when there is a potential multicollinearity problem (Ou
and Penman 1989, Charitou et al. 2004). Specifically, I estimate a stepwise logit regression using
a backward elimination technique with all of the variables in my determinants model (i.e. auditor
characteristics, deal characteristics, company characteristics, audit firm indicators, and industry
indicators) and set the significance level for elimination at the 15 percent level following
Dechow et al. (2011). Consistent with the results in Table 3 and Table 4, I fail to find that auditor
characteristics determine the auditor’s CAM communication decision. However, I find that one
audit firm is positively associated with the probability of communicating an M&A-related CAM
(p-value < 0.05). Regarding M&A deal characteristics, I consistently find that multiple
acquisitions is negatively associated with the communication of an M&A-related CAM (p-value
< 0.1) and that deal size and serial acquirer are positively associated with the communication of
an M&A-related CAM (p-value < 0.01 and p-value < 0.1 respectively). Regarding company
characteristics, I find that restatement announcement, size of the company, foreign operations,
and the number of segments are negatively associated with the communication of M&A-related
CAMs (p-value < 0.05) and that the total number of CAMs is positively associated with the
communication of an M&A-related CAM (p-value < 0.01). It suggests that auditors are less
likely to communicate an M&A-related CAM when clients are larger and more complex. In
addition, three industries are positively associated with the auditor’s decision to communicate an
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M&A-related CAM. The area under the ROC curve is 0.968. Results consistently support that
the auditor’s CAM communication decision is explained by the complexity of audit matter and
operations rather than the auditor attributes.
Robustness Test – Deal Size
As outlined by the PCAOB, CAMs are audit matters that relate to material accounts or
disclosures. In my main analyses, I restrict the sample to M&A deals that management identifies
as material in the annual financial statements. Larger deals are generally more complex, involve
a higher degree of uncertainty, and receive more public scrutiny. Because CAMs are intended to
provide more informative and relevant information to investors, auditors can become more likely
to communicate M&A-related CAMs when deals are more material. Smaller deals should require
less challenging audit judgment, which reduces the likelihood of the auditor identifying the audit
matter as a CAM. To explore the influence of deal size, I re-estimate equation (1) by restricting
the sample to deals to the middle three quintiles and the middle two quartiles based on deal size
respectively.20 In untabulated tests, I consistently find that auditor characteristics do not
influence the auditor’s decision to communicate a CAM and that the decision is driven by the
complexity of the audit matter and operations.
Robustness Test – M&As as the Primary Business
Whereas most companies engage in M&As when they find a target that suits their
strategy, some companies frequently complete M&As as their primary business. Because these
companies have different operations, the judgment that auditors exercise in the CAM
communicating decision could be substantially different from the rest. In untabulated tests, I
remove companies that frequently complete M&As as their primary business (in SIC 6211

20

I include DEAL_MATERIALITY instead of DEAL_SIZE to proxy for the size of the deal.
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Security Brokers, Dealers, and Flotation Companies, SIC 6282 Investment Advice, SIC 6500
Real Estate, SIC 6512 Operators of Nonresidential Buildings, and SIC 6798 Real Estate
Investment Trusts), and consistently find that the auditor’s CAM communication decision is
driven by the complexity of the audit matter and operations rather than the auditor attributes.
Robustness Test – Initial-year Audits
Although initial-year audits typically involve substantial effort from the auditor and
impose extra costs, auditors generally lowball to gain the client’s business (Huang et al. 2009).
As auditors face different economic incentives in the initial year audits, it can further affect the
professional judgment they apply in the decision to communicate CAMs. In untabulated tests, I
remove companies audited by auditors in their initial two years with the clients and consistently
find that the auditor’s CAM communication decision is driven by deal and company
characteristics.
Additional Analysis – Predicted and Actual CAMs
Financial statement users only observe the CAMs communicated in the auditor’s report.
However, it does not provide information about whether the auditors appropriately identified
audit matters as CAMs. The PCAOB notes in its final rule that the determination of CAMs
depends on the complexity of the audit and the complexity of the operations and accounting
systems. Therefore, I first predict the likelihood of an M&A-related audit matter meeting the
definition of a CAM (Probability_CAM) using deal and company characteristics that capture the
complexity of the audit and the complexity of operations and accounting systems using the full
sample. In Table 6 Panel A, I find that the mean probability of an M&A-related audit matter
meeting the definition of a CAM is 46.9 percent. I define observations with a predicted
probability above 0.7 as the cases where the auditor should communicate an M&A-related CAM
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in the auditor’s report (Predict_CAM) and classify observations into four groups: consistent
CAMs (CAM = 1 and Predict_CAM = 1), consistent non-CAMs (CAM = 0 and Predict_CAM =
0), conservative CAMs (CAM = 1 and Predict_CAM = 0), and aggressive CAMs (CAM = 0 and
Predict_CAM = 1). In Table 6 Panel B, I find that 80.5 percent of sample observations involve
CAMs that are consistent between the predictions and the actual CAMs communicated in the
auditor’s report. 14.8 (4.6) percent of sample observations involve auditors that are more
conservative (aggressive) in their decision to report M&A-related CAMs. Because each audit
firm has its own firm-wide policies and training, I explore whether the auditor’s CAM
communication decision varies across audit firms. In Table 6 Panel C, I find that the frequency
of CAMs in each group varies across audit firms. PwC is the auditor with the highest frequency
of consistent CAMs. Among the Big4 audit firms, EY is the most conservative in communicating
M&A-related CAMs. I next explore whether the auditor characteristics vary based on the
auditor’s CAM communication decision. In Table 6 Panel D, I find some variation in the auditor
characteristics across the four groups of auditors based on their CAM reporting behavior.
However, the difference is not significant between any two groups. Taken together, these results
suggest that the M&A-related CAMs communicated in the auditor’s report are generally
consistent with the M&A-related audit matters that are predicted to meet the definition of CAMs
and that audit firms exhibit systematic differences in their decision to communicate M&Arelated CAMs.
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SECTION VI. CONCLUSION
To increase the informativeness and relevance of the auditor’s report, the PCAOB
adopted AS 3101 in 2017, requiring auditors to communicate CAMs that relate to material
accounts or disclosures of the financial statements and involve especially challenging, subjective,
or complex auditor judgment. The communication of CAMs, including the identification of
CAMs and the description of how the auditors addressed the CAMs in the audit, allows auditors
to provide new information to financial statement users about how they exercise professional
judgment in the audit. I use a sample of initial adopters of AS 3101 that completed material
M&As to examine the factors that influence the auditor’s CAM communication decision.
After controlling for M&A deal characteristics and company characteristics, I fail to find
that auditor characteristics at the office- and firm-level significantly influence the auditor’s CAM
communication decision. Instead, the decision is driven by the complexity of the underlying
audit matter and the complexity of operations. By documenting these results, I extend the
literature on auditor judgment and on expanded auditor’s report. My study provides insights for
the PCAOB, audit committees, and investors.
Importantly, my setting allows me to observe the auditor’s decision to communicate a
CAM and empirically examine the factors that influence the auditor’s judgment in the CAM
communication decision. However, the communication of a CAM does not provide evidence
regarding whether the auditors deliver high-quality audits. As the PCAOB conduct inspections of
audit firms and perform post-implementation reviews of the recently adopted standard, the
PCAOB will provide more information on whether auditors have appropriately identified and
communicated CAMs in the expanded auditor’s report.
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Appendix A. Example of Critical Audit Matters related to Mergers and Acquisitions
Report of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm
The Board of Directors and Stockholders of
WestRock Company
Opinion on the Financial Statements
We have audited the accompanying consolidated balance sheets of WestRock Company (the Company) as of September 30, 2019 and 2018, the related consolidated statements of
income, comprehensive income, equity and cash flows for each of the three years in the period ended September 30, 2019, and the related notes (collectively referred to as the
“consolidated financial statements”). In our opinion, the consolidated financial statements present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of the Company at September
30, 2019 and 2018, and the results of its operations and its cash flows for each of the three years in the period ended September 30, 2019, in conformity with U.S. generally accepted
accounting principles.
We also have audited, in accordance with the standards of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States) (PCAOB), the Company's internal control over financial
reporting as of September 30, 2019, based on criteria established in Internal Control-Integrated Framework issued by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway
Commission (2013 framework), and our report dated November 15, 2019 expressed an unqualified opinion thereon.
Adoption of New Accounting Standards
As discussed in Note 2 to the consolidated financial statements, the Company changed its method of accounting for revenue from contracts with customers and certain fulfillment
costs in 2019 due to the adoption of ASC 606, Revenue from Contracts with Customers.
As discussed in Note 1 to the consolidated financial statements, the Company changed its classification of cash receipts on the deferred purchase price receivable on asset-backed
securitization transactions in 2019 due to the adoption of ASU No. 2016-15, Statement of Cash Flows: Classification of Certain Cash Receipts and Cash Payments.
As discussed in Note 1 to the consolidated financial statements, the Company changed its presentation of non-service components of pension and other postretirement income
(expense) in 2019 due to the adoption of ASU No. 2017-07, Compensation – Retirement Benefits (Topic 715): Improving the Presentation of Net Periodic Cost and Net Periodic
Postretirement Benefit Cost.
Basis for Opinion
These financial statements are the responsibility of the Company's management. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on the Company’s financial statements based on our
audits. We are a public accounting firm registered with the PCAOB and are required to be independent with respect to the Company in accordance with the U.S. federal securities
laws and the applicable rules and regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the PCAOB.
We conducted our audits in accordance with the standards of the PCAOB. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether
the financial statements are free of material misstatement, whether due to error or fraud. Our audits included performing procedures to assess the risks of material misstatement of
the financial statements, whether due to error or fraud, and performing procedures that respond to those risks. Such procedures included examining, on a test basis, evidence regarding
the amounts and disclosures in the financial statements. Our audits also included evaluating the accounting principles used and significant estimates made by management, as well
as evaluating the overall presentation of the financial statements. We believe that our audits provide a reasonable basis for our opinion.
Critical Audit Matters
The critical audit matters communicated below are matters arising from the current period audit of the financial statements that were communicated or required to be communicated
to the audit committee and that: (1) relate to accounts or disclosures that are material to the financial statements and (2) involved our especially challenging, subjective or complex
judgments. The communication of critical audit matters does not alter in any way our opinion on the consolidated financial statements, taken as a whole, and we are not, by
communicating the critical audit matters below, providing separate opinions on the critical audit matters or on the accounts or disclosures to which they relate.
Accounting for the Acquisition of KapStone Paper and Packaging Corporation
Description of the Matter

During 2019, the Company completed its acquisition of KapStone Paper and Packaging Corporation (KapStone) for net consideration of $4.9 billion
including debt assumed (the “Transaction”), as disclosed in Note 3 to the consolidated financial statements. The Transaction is accounted for as a business
combination and the Company preliminarily allocated $1,303.0 million of the purchase price to the fair value of the acquired customer relationship
intangible assets. The Company is in the process of analyzing the estimated values of all assets acquired and liabilities assumed including, among other
things, finalizing third-party valuations of certain tangible and intangible assets, as well as the fair value of certain contracts and the determination of
certain tax balances, therefore, the allocation of the purchase price is preliminary and subject to revision as of September 30, 2019.
Auditing management's preliminary allocation of purchase price for its acquisition of KapStone involved especially subjective and complex judgements
due to the significant estimation required in determining the fair value of customer relationship intangible assets. The significant estimation was primarily
due to the complexity of the valuation models used to measure that fair value as well as the sensitivity of the respective fair values to the underlying
significant assumptions. The significant assumptions used to estimate the fair value of the customer relationship intangible assets and subsequent
amortization expense included discount rates, customer attrition rates and economic lives. These significant assumptions are forward-looking and could
be affected by future economic and market conditions.

How We Addressed the
Matter in Our Audit

We tested the design and operating effectiveness of the Company's controls related to the accounting for the KapStone acquisition. For example, we tested
controls over the recognition and measurement of customer relationship intangible assets in the acquisition, including the Company’s controls over the
valuation model, the mathematical accuracy of the valuation model and development of underlying assumptions used to develop such fair value
measurement estimates.
To test the fair value of the Company's customer relationship intangible assets, our audit procedures included, among others, evaluating the Company's
valuation model, the method and significant assumptions used and testing the completeness and accuracy of the underlying data supporting the significant
assumptions and estimates. We involved our valuation specialists to assist with our evaluation of the valuation model and certain significant assumptions.
For example, we reconciled the discount rates to the projected internal rate of return for the Transaction and compared the attrition rates to industry data.
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In addition, to evaluate the effect of changes in assumptions, we performed sensitivity analysis of the fair value of customer relationship intangible assets,
and of amortization expense to the economic lives assigned to the customer relationship intangible assets.
Test of Goodwill for Impairment
Description of the Matter

At September 30, 2019, the Company’s goodwill is $7,285.6 million. As discussed in Note 1 of the consolidated financial statements, goodwill is tested
for impairment at least annually at the reporting unit level. This requires management to estimate the fair value of the reporting units with goodwill
allocated to them.
Auditing management’s goodwill impairment tests involved especially subjective judgements due to the significant estimation required in determining
the fair value of the reporting units. In particular, the estimates for the fair values of the Company’s reporting units are sensitive to assumptions such as
the discount rate and expected future net cash flows, including projected operating results, capital expenditures and tax rates, which are affected by
expectations about future market or economic conditions.

How We Addressed the
Matter in Our Audit

We obtained an understanding, evaluated the design and tested the operating effectiveness of controls over the Company’s goodwill impairment review
process. For example, we tested controls over the estimation of the fair values of the reporting units, including the Company’s controls over the valuation
models, the mathematical accuracy of the valuation models and development of underlying assumptions used to develop such fair values of the reporting
units. We also tested management’s review of the reconciliation of the aggregate estimated fair value of the reporting units to the market capitalization of
the Company.
To test the estimated fair values of the Company’s reporting units, our audit procedures included, among others, assessing the valuation methodology and
the underlying data used by the Company in its analysis, including testing the significant assumptions discussed above. We compared the significant
assumptions used by management to current industry and economic trends, changes to the Company’s business model and other relevant factors. We
assessed the historical accuracy of management’s assumptions of future expected net cash flows and performed sensitivity analyses of significant
assumptions to evaluate the changes in the fair values of the reporting units that would result from changes in the assumptions. We involved valuation
specialists to assist in our evaluation of the valuation methodology and the significant assumptions, including the discount rate used in determining the
fair values of the reporting units. We also tested the reconciliation of the aggregate estimated fair value of the reporting units to the market capitalization
of the Company.
Uncertain Tax Positions

Description of the Matter

As discussed in Note 6 to the consolidated financial statements, the Company has unrecognized income tax benefits of $224.3 million related to its
uncertain tax positions at September 30, 2019. The Company uses significant judgment in determining (1) whether a tax position, based solely on its
technical merits, is more likely than not to be sustained upon examination, and (2) measuring the tax benefit as the largest amount of benefit which is
more likely than not to be realized upon ultimate settlement. The Company does not record any benefit for the tax positions that do not meet the morelikely-than-not initial recognition threshold.
Auditing management’s analysis of its uncertain tax positions and resulting unrecognized income tax benefits involved especially subjective and complex
judgements because each tax position carries unique facts and circumstances that require interpretation of laws, regulations and legal rulings, and other
factors.

How We Addressed the
Matter in Our Audit

We tested the Company’s controls that address the risks of material misstatement relating to uncertain tax positions. For example, we tested controls over
management’s identification of uncertain tax positions and application of the two-step recognition and measurement principles, including management’s
review of the inputs and resulting calculations of unrecognized income tax benefits.
To test the Company’s measurement and recording of its uncertain tax positions, our audit procedures included, among others, inspecting the Company’s
analysis and related tax opinions to evaluate the assumptions the Company used to develop its uncertain tax positions and related unrecognized income
tax benefit amounts by jurisdiction. We also tested the completeness and accuracy of the underlying data used by the Company to calculate its uncertain
tax positions. For example, we compared the unrecognized income tax benefits to similar positions in prior periods and assessed management’s
consideration of current tax controversy and litigation trends in similar positions challenged by tax authorities. In addition, we involved tax subject matter
resources to evaluate the application of relevant tax laws in the Company’s recognition determination. We also evaluated the Company’s income tax
disclosures in relation to these matters included in Note 6 to the consolidated financial statements.

/s/ Ernst & Young LLP
We have served as the Company’s or its predecessor’s auditor since at least 1975, but we are unable to determine the specific year.
Atlanta, Georgia
November 15, 2019
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Appendix B
Variable Definitions and Sources
Variable
Definition [Sources]
Dependent Variable
CAM
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the auditor communicates a CAM under
the topic of “business combinations”, and 0 otherwise [Audit Analytics]
Auditor Characteristics
IMPORTANCE
The ratio of a client’s total fees to the sum of total fees for all clients in an
office [Audit Analytics]
NAS
The sum of non-audit fees divided by total fees paid to the auditor [Audit
Analytics]
ACQ_EXPERT
Indicator variable equal to 1 if at least 30% of all clients at an audit office
completed an acquisition in the current or prior two fiscal years, and 0
otherwise [Audit Analytics and SDC]
TENURE
The natural log of the tenure of the auditor measured in years [Audit
Analytics]
Deal Characteristics
DEAL_SIZE
The quintile of total deal value scaled by lagged total assets
(DEAL_MATERIALITY), with a larger number indicating larger deals
[Hand collection and Compustat]
MULTIPLE_ACQ Indicator equal to 1 if the client completed more than one acquisition, and
0 otherwise [Hand collection]
GOODWILL
Goodwill scaled by total deal value [Hand collection]
SERIAL
Indicator equal to 1 if the client completed an acquisition in each of the
current and prior two years, and 0 otherwise [SDC]
INTAN_GROW
Growth in definite-lived and indefinite-lived intangible assets, excluding
goodwill, divided by total assets [Compustat]
Company Characteristics
RESTATE
Indicator equal to 1 if the client announced a restatement, and 0 otherwise
[Audit Analytics]
ARC
Accounting Reporting Complexity of the company constructed based on
the count of accounting items (XBRL) tags disclosed in the annual
financial statements [XBRL Research Data by Hoitash and Hoitash]
SIZE
The log of total assets [Compustat]
LEV
Book value of debt divided by book value of assets [Compustat]
MTB
Market-to-Book ratio [Compustat]
LOSS
Indicator equal to 1 if the client reports a loss, and 0 otherwise
[Compustat]
FOREIGN
Indicator equal to 1 if the client has foreign operations, and 0 otherwise
[Compustat]
SEG
The sum of business segments and geographic segments [Compustat]
INTAN
The sum of definite-lived intangible assets, indefinite-lived intangible
assets, and goodwill divided by total assets [Compustat]
TOTAL_CAM
The total number of CAMs in the auditor’s report [Audit Analytics]
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TABLE 1
Sample Selection and Composition
Panel A. Sample Selection
Number of
Observations

Description
Large accelerated filers with fiscal years ending on or after 6/30/2019
and before 6/30/2020
Companies identified in Compustat
Companies audited by auditors located in the United States
Companies completed material acquisitions
Companies with non-missing auditor characteristics
Companies with non-missing deal characteristics
Companies with non-missing company characteristics
Initial Sample
Influential Observations based on Cook’s Distance
Final Sample

2005
1990
1880
675
673
673
668
668
(47)
621

Panel B. Observations by Industry
Industry
1-Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, Mining, and
Construction
2-Manufacturing
3-Transportation, Communication, Electric,
Gas, and Sanitary Services
4-Wholesale Trade
5-Retail Trade
6-Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate
7-Services
Total
Average
Panel C. Observations by Auditor
Auditor
N
1-PwC
150
2-EY
170
3-Deloitte
132
4-KPMG
112
5-Non Big4
57
Total
621
Average

N

TOTAL_CAM

Percentage
(CAM=1)

19

1.842

0.474

252

1.754

0.448

45

2.022

0.622

17
22
100
166
621

1.824
1.591
1.830
1.765

0.353
0.273
0.540
0.458

1.787

0.470

TOTAL_CAM
1.713
2.041
1.538
1.777
1.825

Percentage (CAM=1)
0.453
0.565
0.348
0.473
0.509

1.787

0.470
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Notes: This table reports the sample selection and distribution. Panel A reports the results of the sample selection. I
remove 47 influential observations identified using influence diagnostics with a Cook’s Distance greater than 4/n.
Panel B reports the distribution of observations by industry. I define industry following the classification provided
by the NAICS Association. I combine companies in Division A (SIC 01-09 Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing),
Division B (SIC 10-14 Mining), and Division C (SIC 15-17 Construction) into one industry because each industry
has a small number of observations. Panel C reports the distribution of observations by the auditor. All variables are
defined in Appendix B.
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TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics of the Initial Sample
Variable
N
Mean Std Dev

P10

P25

P50

P75

P90

Auditor characteristics

IMPORTANCE
NAS
ACQ_EXPERT
TENURE

668
668
668
668

0.131
0.153
0.051
2.708

0.179
0.129
0.220
0.924

0.013
0.006
0
1.609

0.025
0.047
0
2.079

0.063
0.129
0
2.833

0.156
0.229
0
3.296

0.324
0.332
0
3.912

668
668
668
668
668

0.100
0.332
0.462
0.232
0.011

0.182
0.471
0.264
0.422
0.091

0.004
0
0.091
0
-0.022

0.013
0
0.282
0
-0.010

0.037
0
0.476
0
-0.001

0.114
1
0.641
0
0.003

0.254
1
0.776
1
0.038

0.288
138.798
1.422
0.208
174.541
0.456
0.498
5.724
0.232
0.777

0
304
6.979
0.046
0.846
0
0
2
0.035
1

0
357
7.628
0.166
1.508
0
0
5
0.107
1

0
431
8.517
0.322
2.880
0
1
8
0.307
2

0
545
9.521
0.459
6.033
1
1
12
0.517
2

0
640
10.696
0.571
14.196
1
1
17
0.656
3

P10

P25

P50

P75

P90

Deal characteristics

DEAL_MATERIALITY
MULTIPLE_ACQ
GOODWILL
SERIAL
INTAN_GROW
Company characteristics

RESTATE
ARC
SIZE
LEV
MTB
LOSS
FOREIGN
SEG
INTAN
TOTAL_CAM

668 0.091
668 457.413
668 8.666
668 0.326
668 0.030
668 0.295
668 0.552
668 9.039
668 0.327
668 1.801

Panel B. Descriptive Statistics of the Final Sample
Variable
N
Mean Std Dev
Auditor characteristics

IMPORTANCE
NAS
ACQ_EXPERT
TENURE

621
621
621
621

0.124
0.154
0.040
2.704

0.172
0.130
0.197
0.914

0.013
0.006
0
1.609

0.025
0.046
0
2.079

0.059
0.132
0
2.833

0.151
0.236
0
3.296

0.297
0.333
0
3.871

621
621
621
621
621

0.096
0.338
0.461
0.235
0.011

0.148
0.473
0.263
0.424
0.093

0.004
0
0.100
0
-0.022

0.012
0
0.282
0
-0.010

0.037
0
0.476
0
-0.002

0.113
1
0.638
0
0.003

0.251
1
0.773
1
0.040

Deal characteristics

DEAL_MATERIALITY
MULTIPLE_ACQ
GOODWILL
SERIAL
INTAN_GROW
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TABLE 2 continued
Company characteristics

RESTATE
ARC
SIZE
LEV
MTB
LOSS
FOREIGN
SEG
INTAN
TOTAL_CAM

621 0.085
621 455.768
621 8.637
621 0.322
621 6.600
621 0.287
621 0.562
621 9.077
621 0.331
621 1.787

0.280
135.196
1.401
0.207
20.862
0.453
0.497
5.756
0.232
0.766

Panel C. Tests of Differences in Means
Variable
CAM = 1
N
Mean

0
306
6.981
0.047
0.846
0
0
2
0.038
1

0
357
7.623
0.164
1.520
0
0
5
0.111
1

0
429
8.502
0.314
2.953
0
1
8
0.310
2

CAM = 0
N
Mean

0
540
9.502
0.454
6.066
1
1
12
0.523
2

0
640
10.614
0.565
14.196
1
1
17
0.658
3

Difference

Auditor characteristics

IMPORTANCE
NAS
ACQ_EXPERT
TENURE

292
292
292
292

0.12
0.15
0.03
2.68

329
329
329
329

0.13
0.16
0.05
2.73

-0.005
-0.012
-0.018
-0.050

292
292
292
292
292

0.17
0.34
0.45
0.26
0.01

329
329
329
329
329

0.03
0.33
0.47
0.21
0.01

0.146***
0.008
-0.021
0.048
-0.002

292
292
292
292
292
292
292
292
292
292

0.08
449.54
8.46
0.32
5.93
0.32
0.49
8.58
0.36
2.24

329
329
329
329
329
329
329
329
329
329

0.09
461.29
8.79
0.32
7.20
0.26
0.62
9.52
0.30
1.39

-0.012
-11.754
-0.324***
-0.004
-1.274
0.067*
-0.130***
-0.947**
0.061***
0.854***

Deal characteristics

DEAL_SIZE
MULTIPLE_ACQ
GOODWILL
SERIAL
INTAN_GROW
Company characteristics

RESTATE
ARC
SIZE
LEV
MTB
LOSS
FOREIGN
SEG
INTAN
TOTAL_CAM

Notes: Panel A reports the descriptive statistics of the initial sample. Panel B reports the descriptive statistics of the
final sample after removing influential observations. I remove 47 influential observations identified using influence
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diagnostics with a Cook’s Distance greater than 4/n. Panel C reports the tests of differences in means and p-values
are based on two-tailed tests. All variables are defined in Appendix B.
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TABLE 3
Auditor Characteristics, Deal Characteristics, and M&A-related CAMs
CAM
IMPORTANCE
NAS
ACQ_EXPERT
TENURE

(1)
0.210
(0.700)
-0.787
(0.214)
-0.599
(0.220)
-0.049
(0.584)

AUDITOR_1
AUDITOR_2
AUDITOR_3
AUDITOR_4

(2)
0.072
(0.904)
-0.689
(0.291)
-0.529
(0.283)
-0.047
(0.606)
-0.207
(0.542)
0.223
(0.510)
-0.653*
(0.063)
-0.154
(0.662)

DEAL_ SIZE
MULTIPLE_ACQ
GOODWILL
SERIAL
INTAN_GROW
Constant

N
AUC

0.131
(0.617)
621
0.534

0.278
(0.457)
621
0.596

(3)

1.561***
(0.000)
-0.660***
(0.007)
-0.586
(0.195)
-0.148
(0.579)
0.595
(0.720)
-4.334***
(0.000)
621
0.899

(4)
0.468
(0.571)
0.401
(0.681)
-0.315
(0.678)
0.097
(0.466)
-0.486
(0.313)
0.128
(0.789)
-1.382***
(0.005)
-0.461
(0.365)
1.663***
(0.000)
-0.621**
(0.014)
-0.506
(0.271)
-0.207
(0.469)
0.068
(0.970)
-4.603***
(0.000)
621
0.908

Notes: This table reports the results for the determinants of an M&A-related CAM using Logit Regression. P-values
appear in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** denote two-tailed statistical significance at the
10, 5, 1 percent levels, respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix B.
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TABLE 4
The Determinants of M&A-related CAMs
(1)
IMPORTANCE
NAS
ACQ_EXPERT
TENURE
DEAL_SIZE
MULTIPLE_ACQ
GOODWILL
SERIAL
INTAN_GROW
RESTATE
ARC
SIZE
LEV
MTB
LOSS
FOREIGN
SEG
INTAN
TOTAL_CAM
AUDITOR_1
AUDITOR_2
AUDITOR_3
AUDITOR_4
IND_2
IND_3
IND_4
IND_5
IND_6
IND_7
Constant
N
AUC

Coeff.
-0.411
1.007
-0.536
0.093
1.886***
-0.826**
-0.292
0.604
1.612
-1.270**
0.002
-0.313**
-1.282*
-0.007
-0.556
-0.723**
-0.050**
-0.431
2.741***

p-value
(0.691)
(0.430)
(0.590)
(0.581)
(0.000)
(0.011)
(0.632)
(0.105)
(0.512)
(0.025)
(0.128)
(0.041)
(0.096)
(0.323)
(0.143)
(0.039)
(0.010)
(0.585)
(0.000)

-7.215***

(0.000)

621
0.963

CAM
(2)
Coeff.
-0.259
0.910
-0.651
0.082
1.922***
-0.849**
-0.354
0.670*
1.710
-1.447**
0.002
-0.331**
-1.440*
-0.009
-0.490
-0.898**
-0.048**
-0.574
2.729***
0.811
0.248
-0.270
-0.024

p-value
(0.825)
(0.482)
(0.530)
(0.633)
(0.000)
(0.011)
(0.564)
(0.080)
(0.485)
(0.015)
(0.185)
(0.040)
(0.070)
(0.229)
(0.204)
(0.014)
(0.013)
(0.473)
(0.000)
(0.214)
(0.691)
(0.674)
(0.972)

-7.010***

(0.000)

621
0.964

(3)
Coeff.
0.734
0.771
-1.032
0.134
2.131***
-0.971***
-0.282
0.689*
2.206
-1.210*
-0.000
-0.540***
-1.011
-0.008
-0.120
-0.526
-0.054***
0.240
2.877***
1.594**
0.825
0.496
0.370
-0.183
0.632
-1.815
-0.281
2.255*
-1.116
-6.545***

p-value
(0.575)
(0.575)
(0.382)
(0.468)
(0.000)
(0.006)
(0.668)
(0.085)
(0.436)
(0.062)
(0.870)
(0.003)
(0.273)
(0.422)
(0.777)
(0.215)
(0.007)
(0.797)
(0.000)
(0.028)
(0.223)
(0.481)
(0.608)
(0.879)
(0.630)
(0.265)
(0.852)
(0.078)
(0.356)
(0.000)

621
0.970

Notes: This table reports the results for the determinants of an M&A-related CAM using Stepwise Logit Regression.
Regarding auditor and industry indicators, AUDITOR_5 and IND_1 are in the intercept. P-values appear in
parentheses next to the coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 10, 5, 1
percent levels. Variables are defined in Appendix B.

45

TABLE 5
The Determinants of M&A-related CAMs using Stepwise Logit Regression
CAM
AUDITOR1
DEAL_SIZE
MULTIPLE_ACQ
SERIAL
SIZE
RESTATE
FOREIGN
SEG
TOTAL_CAM
INDUSTRY4
INDUSTRY6
INDUSTRY7
constant

Coeff.
0.934**
2.084***
-0.915***
0.701*
-0.463***
-1.215**
-0.627*
-0.053***
2.902***
-1.733
2.115***
-1.185***
-6.557***

Observations
AUC

p-value
(0.018)
(0.000)
(0.007)
(0.064)
(0.001)
(0.038)
(0.088)
(0.005)
(0.000)
(0.113)
(0.000)
(0.003)
(0.000)
621
0.968

Notes: This table reports the results for the determinants of an M&A-related CAM using Stepwise Logit Regression.
P-values appear in parentheses next to the coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** denote two-tailed statistical
significance at the 10, 5, 1 percent levels. Variables are defined in Appendix B.
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TABLE 6
Predicted and Actual CAMs
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics of Predicted CAMs
Variable
N
Mean Std Dev P10
Probability_CAM
668
0.469
0.368
0.028
Predict_CAM
668
0.367
0.482
0

P25
0.087
0

Panel B. Predicted and Actual M&A-related CAMs
Consistent
Consistent
Conservative
Variable
CAMs
Non-CAMs
CAMs
N
214
324
99
Percentage
0.320
0.485
0.148

P50
0.438
0

P75
0.863
1

Aggressive
CAMs
31
0.046

Panel C. Percentage of Predicted and Actual M&A-related CAMs by Auditor
Consistent
Consistent
Conservative
Aggressive
Variable
CAMs
Non-CAMs
CAMs
CAMs
1-PwC
0.333
0.509
0.119
0.038
2-EY
0.400
0.394
0.167
0.039
3-Deloitte
0.197
0.585
0.156
0.061
4-KPMG
0.331
0.500
0.136
0.034
5-Non Big4
0.328
0.422
0.172
0.078

P90
0.966
1

Total
668
1

Total
159
180
147
118
64

Panel D. The Means of Auditor Characteristics by CAM Reporting Decision
Consistent
Consistent
Conservative
Aggressive
Variable
CAMs
Non-CAMs
CAMs
CAMs
IMPORTANCE
0.126
0.128
0.109
0.106
NAS
0.143
0.160
0.162
0.164
ACQ_EXPERT
0.037
0.050
0.013
0.000
TENURE
2.649
2.729
2.754
2.686
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